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Abstract
Background: Response to the COVID-19 pandemic has required innovative approaches to vaccination, including methods to rapidly and safely immunize communities. A major
challenge to such a response involved access to untapped
healthcare worker resources. The Louisville, Kentucky, response involved the use of a large volunteer workforce to supplement local public health employees in planning and implementing a large-scale drive-through vaccination event. The
objective of this manuscript was to outline processes involved
in training a mass immunization workforce and implementating a large-scale COVID-19 community vaccination.
Approach: Competency-based and standardized training
was provided for every volunteer before working their shift.
Volunteers worked four-hour shifts, and training sessions
were held at the beginning of every shift. Training included
three overarching goals with associated procedures: to protect the vaccine supply, protect the individuals being vaccinated, and protect the healthcare workforce during a 17-week

Background
Novel approaches to immunization have been implemented in Louisville, Kentucky, for close to thirty
years, with the first drive-through influenza vaccination occurring in 1994.[1] Provision of influenza immunization via drive-through became an annual event
for the next ten years as the general public and healthcare providers grew to be more comfortable with vaccination occurring outside the traditional office setting.
Through these experiences, Louisville, a moderately
sized community of just under one million, demonstrated an ability to develop and implement innovative approaches to healthcare delivery. Interest in the

ULJRI | https://ir.library.louisville.edu/jri/vol6/iss1/3

large-scale community drive-through vaccination campaign.
Results: Between January 4, 2021, and April 28, 2021,
LouVax–Broadbent was open for operation for 82 days. A total of 109,529 doses of COVID-19 vaccine were administered
at LouVax–Broadbent; 2,561 volunteers served the community at LouVax–Broadbent, yielding approximately 81,200 volunteer hours. Three needlestick injuries were reported, all of
which occurred during safety device activation. Procedures
that served to protect the vaccine resulted in a waste of 132
(0.12%) of the 109,529 prepared doses.
Conclusions: Vaccination rate outcomes at LouVax–
Broadbent demonstrated an ability to engage, train, and
safely implement a large and dedicated group of volunteer
healthcare and non-healthcare workers as part of a largescale community mass COVID-19 drive-through vaccination
event.

drive-through process for immunization prompted the
compilation of the activities into a book that was subsequently shared across the US and internationally.[2]
Building upon provider and public acceptance, procedures for drive-through immunization as part of largescale public health response were developed, then used
in 2009 in Louisville to address the H1N1 influenza
pandemic. The 2009 mass H1N1 immunization event
was held at the University of Louisville football stadium parking lot. Planning for the event was a collaboration between researchers, clinicians, and emergency
management at the University of Louisville and the
full spectrum of planners at the Louisville Metro Department of Public Health & Wellness (LMPHW) and
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the City of Louisville. As a result of those efforts, approximately 20,000 H1N1 influenza vaccine doses were
administered to community members in less than 18
hours as part of the vaccine roll-out. National and
international media coverage chronicled the event as
the largest mass immunization drive-through effort to
have occurred anywhere in the world.[3] To address national and international interest in drive-through vaccination, a new ‘how-to’ manual was published in 2020
as concerns about an emerging infection pandemic became a reality.[4]
Interventions to address the current COVID-19 pandemic have resulted in renewed interest in how rapid
large-scale vaccination could be implemented in local
communities. Making vaccine available to entire communities during the COVID-19 pandemic required that
a respiratory protection component be added to the
standard safe immunization practices, resulting in a
broader approach to infection control.[5] Public health
leadership in Louisville, Kentucky, embraced the notion of drive-through mass immunization as the most
effective initial approach for administering COVID-19
vaccine to the general public as part of pandemic response. Release of three COVID-19 vaccines through
emergency use authorization (EUA) brought a new
level of complexity to mass immunization but further
underscored the urgent need for training as a foundation for community-based rapid mass immunization
capabilities.[6-8]
The objective of this paper is to outline the processes
involved in training a mass immunization workforce
and implementing a large-scale COVID-19 community
vaccination effort in Louisville, Kentucky.

Approach
Planning for COVID-19 mass vaccination using a drivethrough approach began in late summer 2020. Operational documents from the 2009 H1N1 influenza mass
vaccination event were evaluated by public health
planners to determine their utility and applicability as
a planning guide. Broadbent Arena, a large indoor area
located on state property, was identified as a centrally
located and ideal location where indoor vaccination
could occur and be minimally impacted by weather.
Broadbent Arena had been regularly used for monster
truck shows, and the ventilation system was capable
of addressing the environmental concerns of vehicular
exhaust in the enclosed arena. Fully opening entry and
exit arena doorways provided additional airflow. Air
quality and ventilation capabilities were evaluated and
deemed safe and acceptable by Louisville Metro Public Health and Wellness (LMPHW) environmentalists,
both at the time of planning and daily throughout the
vaccination event. The Louisville drive-through mass
vaccination site was aptly named LouVax–Broadbent.
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The size and configuration of the arena enabled planning for three zones of operation. Zone 1 was the area
outside the arena entrance where cars were organized
into lines in preparation for entry into the arena. Uniformed police officers were also stationed in Zone 1 to
assist with traffic control, if needed, and provide visible security. A pre-registration process aligned with
the federal government’s phased approach for vaccination was used to organize population groups sent
to LouVax–Broadbent. These population groups included healthcare workers, teachers, first responders,
and older adults. Registration was managed through
a LMPHW call center. Individuals who had been preregistered were provided with an auto-response email
containing a QR code, and they were advised to have
that QR code accessible upon arrival at the arena. The
QR code was shown to Zone 1 personnel; then, the individual was guided toward Zone 2. Electronic access
to registration lists was available for Zone 1 personnel
so that they could assist those who had lost or were unable to produce their individual QR code.
Cars entered Zone 2 through a large cargo door, where
they were immediately directed by trained personnel
into one of six vaccination lanes. Although the process was designed to operate via drive-through, there
was also a designated area in Zone 2 where walk-up
traffic could be accommodated. Zone 2A provided a
place for bus transportation, shared ride transportation (e.g., Uber, Lyft), groups requiring interpreters, and
other special needs unable to be addressed efficiently
via drive-through. Once vaccine was administered,
cars would exit the arena and be directed toward Zone
3. Zone 3 was an area outside the arena where postvaccination monitoring occurred. Figure 1 shows the
schematics for LouVax–Broadbent, and Figure 2 shows
an aerial view of the arena and adjacent areas. Training for volunteers working in Zones 1 and 3 was provided by LMPHW and the City of Louisville. Training
for Zone 2 was provided by personnel from the University of Louisville Division of Infectious Diseases Center for Education and Training in Infection Prevention
(CETIP).
Training the workforce for implementation of mass
vaccination at LouVax–Broadbent involved three overarching objectives: 1) protect the vaccine, 2) protect the
person receiving the vaccine (recipient), and 3) protect
the workforce involved in vaccine administration.
LouVax–Broadbent workforce
Following a two-week pilot phase, full operation began
on January 4, 2021, and continued for 17 weeks, with
the last day of operation on April 29, 2021. A unique
aspect of this COVID-19 mass vaccination event was
its use of volunteers for the vast majority of the workforce in all three Zones. Volunteer healthcare workers
were recruited through professional associations (e.g.,
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Figure 1. Schematics for LouVax–Broadbent.
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Figure 2. Aerial view of the arena and adjacent areas.
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Figure 3. Blue Vest medical team.

Greater Louisville Medical Society, Kentucky Nurses
Association) and the media/social media. All volunteers were eligible for vaccination after volunteering for forty hours, or often sooner. Louisville Metro
Government and LMPHW personnel provided leadership and management oversight. A typical day’s
workforce would consist of 115 volunteers and 39 LMPHW or Louisville Metro Government employees. All
volunteers were on-site, with a portion of LMPHW
or Metro Government employees at off-site locations
(e.g., registration call centers). Zone 3 also required
an ambulance and two emergency medical technicians
(EMT)/paramedics, employed by the Louisville Metro
Government, on site at all times. The Incident Commander and Medical Director (physician), as well as a
group of Louisville Metro Government and LMPHW
employees, were on site every day as part of Command
Center operations. An advanced practice registered
nurse (APRN) with expertise in immunization, infection control, and education was a primary planner for
Zone 2 operations and was on site daily throughout the
entire vaccination event. The medical team working
with this APRN planner consisted of advanced practice
registered nurses and registered nurses with expertise
in mass immunization, infectious diseases, infection
control, adult and pediatric healthcare clinical practice,
and adult education. This volunteer medical team represented CETIP at the University of Louisville and the
Kentucky Nurses Association. The volunteer and paid
employee workforce staffed each of the three zones of
operation, with the vaccination site doors opening for
operation Monday–Friday at 08:00 and closing at 17:00
ULJRI | https://ir.library.louisville.edu/jri/vol6/iss1/3

or whenever the last cars were through the process.
Volunteers were enrolled into a sign-up and notification system (MyImpact™) managed by the Louisville
Metro Government. Vetting of licensure occurred as
part of initial volunteer enrollment. Weekly notices
were sent to the volunteer workforce via email, outlining specific areas of need within the three zones
(e.g., vaccinator, pharmacy volunteer, screener). Volunteers signed up to work in a designated role for a
four-hour shift (07:30–11:30, 11:00–15:00, 14:30–17:30),
with overlap occurring to allow time for training, process updates, shift changes, and end-of-day procedures. Volunteers working in the pharmacy area in
Zone 2 or those administering vaccine were licensed
healthcare workers either currently employed or retired. The pharmacy area was also staffed by licensed
healthcare workers and always included at least one
licensed pharmacist. Volunteers working in all other
areas represented a variety of skills, backgrounds, and
age groups. All volunteers, without exception, were
trained prior to beginning their shift. Aspects of training were focused on the competencies required for the
roles. Training procedures, training manuals, tools, and
resources for training were developed by CETIP personnel and updated frequently as part of continuous
performance assessment and improvement.
The medical team was responsible for setting up Zone
2 vaccination areas, training, continuous performance
assessment and improvement, addressing questions involving vaccines and the vaccination process, managing concerns regarding screening and safety, and trou-
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bleshooting. During the first seven weeks of operation, members of the medical team set up the pharmacy
area for use each day. With the expansion of the pharmacy team, this was transitioned to a pharmacy team
responsibility, and both pharmacy and medical teams
worked together to provide orientation and training for
those responsible for vaccine handling, management,
and preparation. Members of the volunteer medical
team wore blue vests, so they were easily and quickly
recognized and identified (Figure 3). At least one “Blue
Vest” medical team member, often two or three, was
on-site for the entire day of operation and worked with
the designated site leader for Zone 2. The site leader
was an employee of the LMPHW or Louisville Metro
Government and reported to the site Incident Commander. This relationship facilitated rapid communication and response between the site Incident Commander and Chief Medical Officer—both employed by
Louisville Metro Government and LMPHW—and the
Blue Vest medical team. The pharmacy lead also reported to the Zone 2 site leader and worked collaboratively with the Blue Vest medical team.
Protecting the vaccine
Protecting the vaccine involved management and
preparation of the vaccine and all prepared doses from
the time of vaccine arrival at LouVax–Broadbent to the
time at which remaining vaccine was returned to LMPHW at the end of the day. Vaccine protective activities
included: 1) checking in of the arriving vaccine; 2) monitoring the temperature and environmental conditions
of the vaccine throughout the preparation and dilution
(if indicated) processes, 3) selection and use of appropriate needle and syringe combinations for preparation
and administration, 4) procedures to prepare vaccine
so that each syringe was ready for injection, 5) labeling and delivering syringes to the vaccination table, 6)
maintenance of the filled syringes through delivery to
the vaccination stations and until administration to the
vaccine recipient, and 7) monitoring of time between
vaccine vial removal from the refrigerated environment
and vaccine administration.
Checking in of the arriving vaccine: Moderna and
Pizer COVID-19 vaccines were available through U.S.
Food & Drug Administration (FDA) EUA and were
administered at LouVax–Broadbent. As neither contained a preservative, both had challenging handling
and management requirements. All vaccine was delivered by LMPHW transport refrigerators, accompanied
by data loggers for temperature monitoring. Transport refrigerators contained a single type of vaccine
from a single lot. If multiple lots were delivered or
more than one type of vaccine was delivered, each
would arrive in a separate transport refrigerator and
would remain separated throughout the vaccine event
day. Hourly monitoring and written documentation
of temperature, as well as monitoring of the data log-
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ger, was recorded and maintained as is standard practice. An on-site pharmaceutical-grade vaccine refrigerator/freezer was also made available for storage of vaccine if large numbers of doses were being prepared and
additional storage was needed. This refrigerator also
maintained a temperature data logger for both refrigerator and freezer compartments, and documentation
of temperature was also done manually. In addition, a
digital thermometer documenting the ambient temperature of LouVax–Broadbent was monitored and documented to ensure that doses of vaccine were not subjected to unfavorable temperature conditions after syringe preparation and while awaiting administration.
Vaccine delivered from LMPHW would be accepted for
receipt by a pharmacy volunteer each morning at approximately 07:00. Temperature verifications during
transport, lot numbers of the vaccine vials, and the total number of vials and doses delivered were verified
and documented. Stickers that would be used to place
on patient document forms and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) vaccine cards were
printed at LouVax–Broadbent each morning once vaccine lot numbers and doses had been verified. Pages
of stickers would be delivered to the vaccination tables
along with the prepared syringes. Stickers for the Pfizer
vaccine were printed with black ink on white stickers,
and a purple highlighter line was drawn, thereby visually indicating the Pfizer vaccine. Moderna stickers were printed with light blue ink on white stickers. This color-coding approach was used throughout
the process as an error-proofing step. Once all vaccine had been verified and checked-in, and lot numbers
on printed vaccine stickers were confirmed, vials were
made available to the pharmacy team to begin preparation for that day’s event. Vials were removed from
refrigerators and provided to the pharmacy volunteers
according to the number of registered vaccine recipients. The goal was to ensure that no vaccine was prepared or outside the refrigerated environment for more
than four hours before administration to an individual.
Monitoring temperature and environmental conditions of the vaccine: The Broadbent Arena environment is similar to a giant garage, so special considerations for protecting the vaccine were implemented.
Three biosafety cabinets were borrowed from the University of Louisville to better provide a clean environment for preparing and filling syringes with the vaccine (Figure 4). It was determined that all vaccine
would be handled in a designated and restricted area,
with vaccine vials opened and vaccines prepared in
the biosafety cabinet (“under the hood”). The cabinets were transported to the arena by physical plant
personnel. Once in place, they were decontaminated
and certified for use by an external partner using standard practices reviewed and approved by University
of Louisville Department of Environmental Health and
Safety personnel. Protocols were developed for open-
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Figure 4. Pharmacy area and biosafety cabinets.

ing (beginning of the day) and closing (end of the day)
of the biosafety cabinets to ensure daily cleaning and
disinfection.
Selection and use of appropriate needle and syringe combinations: Personnel responsible for handling the vaccine and preparing syringes were trained
by the APRN medical team planner and a practicing
pharmacist to ensure competence. At least one registered pharmacist was on site every day throughout
the entire LouVax–Broadbent operation, with four to
six additional personnel working as part of the pharmacy team. The team also included a pharmacy lead,
a vaccine accountability lead, and a runner. The entire
pharmacy team consisted of at least eight individuals
with demonstrated competence in aspects of vaccine
handling, management, and preparation. Each day, the
pharmacy lead evaluated all needle and syringe combinations in the ancillary kits provided by the individual
vaccine manufacturers. This ensured adequate supply
and also ensured that the combinations were appropriate for the vaccine. For example, the Pfizer vaccine required dilution, so separate syringes and needles for dilution were needed. In addition, needles and syringes
with low “dead space” were essential to ensure that all
doses could be completely withdrawn from the vaccine
multidose vials. Evaluation of the needle and syringe
supply was done the day before they would be used as
a means of providing appropriate and adequate supply on site for the next vaccination day. Figure 5 shows
the many needle and syringe combinations included in
the ancillary kits provided by the vaccine manufactur-

ULJRI | https://ir.library.louisville.edu/jri/vol6/iss1/3

ers and delivered with vaccine supplies.
Withdrawing vaccine from vials, dilution, mixing,
and preparing syringes for administration: Training
for all pharmacy team members focused on safe injection practices, including hand hygiene, use of the
biosafety cabinet, and clean and sterile techniques.
Pharmacy and CDC standards were used as a basis
for training.[9, 10] All syringes were opened and filled
under the hood by members of the pharmacy team.
Pfizer vaccines were handled in a biosafety cabinet labeled with a large “Pfizer” sign, and Moderna vaccines
were handled in a biosafety cabinet labeled with a large
“Moderna” sign. Vaccines were never combined in any
biosafety cabinet as a way of preventing error. A middle biosafety cabinet was used to pre-draw the saline
required for reconstitution of the Pfizer vaccine and
served as a ‘buffer zone’ for clear separation of the two
vaccines.
Differing dosages, dilution processes, and preparation
logistics made this a particularly challenging step in
the process. To facilitate efficiency and prevent error,
the processes were divided into specific steps, with personnel assigned specific responsibilities. For example,
one individual would be responsible for filling syringes
used for diluting the Pfizer vaccine. Sterile syringe tips
were purchased to enable that individual to fill multiple syringes in immediate succession. Syringes remained under the hood for use throughout a single volunteer’s four-hour shift. Each syringe was checked for
appropriate volume by another designated volunteer.
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Figure 5. Needle and syringe combinations provided in ancillary supply kits.

Competencies were developed to help guide training
and identify gaps in demonstrated abilities. For example, a training vial was tinted with food coloring and
used to demonstrate the dilution volume as well as
doses. This enabled individuals assigned to the pharmacy area to demonstrate competence while also enabling the pharmacy lead to correct practice prior to
that person moving into the syringe production process.
Once the saline syringe had been prepared and
checked, it was passed to another pharmacy team to
dilute the vaccine and withdraw the dose amount. The
diluent syringes were 3 cc in volume with a black syringe tip, so it was easy to visually identify them. All
syringes prepared for a single day were used during
that day. Beginning with the last shift of each day, diluent syringes were prepared at a cadence that was more
real-time to minimize waste as any diluent syringe remaining unused at the end of a vaccination day would
be discarded. When vaccine (Pfizer) was ready for
preparation, the pharmacy team would place a sterile
needle onto the tip of the saline syringe and inject the
entire amount into the undiluted vaccine vial. Diluted
vials were handed to another pharmacist to withdraw
into syringes prepared for administration. This process
prevented errors in dilution (e.g., failure to dilute or
multiple dilutions) in any given vial. Syringes would
be prepared in groups corresponding to the number of
doses withdrawn from that vial. For example, a vial of
Pfizer vaccine would provide six doses, so all six doses
would be withdrawn and placed into a single tray for
dose verification. Pharmacy team members would use
the syringe and needle combinations selected for that
day and prepare four syringes with a 1-inch needle and
two syringes with a 1½-inch needle to allow for intramuscular administration to patients of all body sizes.
The vial would remain in the tray with those six syringes until all had been dose-checked by another pharmacy team member. If any syringe was determined to
contain either more or less than the required 0.3 mL
ULJRI | https://ir.library.louisville.edu/jri/vol6/iss1/3

dose, the tray was returned to the hood so dosing in
that/those syringe(s) could be adjusted. On occasion,
an air bubble would be identified in a syringe, necessitating that additional volume be added to that syringe.
Completed and checked trays would be placed in a designated area for labeling and documentation. The same
processes were used to fill syringes with Moderna vaccine, but without dilution. Trays of 10 syringes would
be prepared, six with 1-inch needles and four with 1½inch needles, with a double-checking process for dose
volume performed as was done with the previously described Pfizer doses.
Labeling vaccine doses and delivery to vaccination tables: Prepared trays of filled syringes were labeled
with a sticker noting the name of the vaccine. Purple Pfizer and light blue Moderna stickers were used.
Once the prepared trays of syringes had completed
the quality check (e.g., ensuring correct dose, all needles and caps checked for tight connection), the trays
were placed inside 1-gallon resealable plastic bags, and
the time at which the vaccine vial was removed from
the refrigerator was written on the outside of the bag.
Personnel at the vaccination tables were instructed to
maintain trays inside the bag, enabling visual checks
to monitor time out of the refrigerator for each dose.
When trays were empty, personnel at the vaccination
table alerted the pharmacy runner, who could retrieve
the tray and bag and return both to the pharmacy area.
Trays were disinfected and placed back into the production line. The time on the plastic bag was crossed
out and the bag reused throughout that day.
Maintenance of the filled syringes: Filled syringes
remained at each vaccination table until all were used.
If a syringe or needle was contaminated (e.g., dropped
on the ground), the pharmacy runner was notified so
that the syringe could be returned to the pharmacy area
for disposal and documentation. If there was need for a
syringe with a different needle size (e.g., a longer needle
was needed but not available at the table at that time),
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Figure 6. Signage for communication.

the vaccinating table personnel would notify the pharmacy runner, who could exchange a syringe from one
vaccination station for the next or return the syringe to
the pharmacy area, where a new needle could be applied under the hood. No needle changes were allowed
to be done outside the pharmacy biosafety cabinet. At
the end of the vaccination day, any remaining vaccine
doses were returned to the pharmacy area. Those doses
were used for any unvaccinated volunteer or individuals who were on a waiting-to-be-called list. If a dose
was unable to be administered, it was destroyed and
documented in accordance with LMPHW policy.

Signs were developed and used by vaccinators to request specific types of vaccines. Pfizer tables, signs
and syringe labels were purple and Moderna were
light blue. In addition, specific signs were developed
to communicate with others to indicate need for vaccine, patient-related questions, need for mechanical assistance with cars, or help with technology (Figure
6). This helped to visually facilitate communication
between vaccinators, pharmacy runners, and support
personnel, and helped the Zone 2 Blue Vest team to
identify practice deviations and real-time needs at the
vaccination tables while also minimizing wasted doses.

Monitoring of time from vaccine removal from refrigerator until administration: The pharmacy team
leader maintained a log of the time a vial was removed
from its refrigerated environment, all doses prepared,
all doses of diluent prepared, any waste (e.g., syringe
dropped or contaminated, or unused doses at the end
of a vaccination event day), additional or ‘bonus’ doses
obtained from a given vial of vaccine, and numbers delivered to the vaccination stations. This information
was provided daily and made available throughout the
day to the LMPHW chief medical officer. At the end of
each volunteer shift, as part of shift change, all doses
were evaluated for timing to ensure that no dose was
outside the refrigerated environment for more than the
four-hour goal. Remaining doses at or around the fourhour goal were identified and a plan for first administration was discussed with personnel at the vaccination
stations.

Protecting the vaccine recipient
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Protecting the vaccine recipient required that the process: 1) uniformly screen all recipients prior to vaccination, 2) ensure infection prevention and control
throughout the vaccination process, 3) ensure safe injection practice, 4) use administration techniques to facilitate intramuscular injection of the vaccine, 5) document the screening and vaccination process, 6) recognize and respond to immediate adverse events, and
7) provide patient education, including orientation
to CDC V-safe, the adverse event monitoring system
available via cell phone. Standardized training procedures were developed, and group training for all personnel in Zone 2 was done at every shift change, regardless of how often an individual had participated
as part of LouVax–Broadbent.
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Figure 7. Inside LouVax Zone 2 in operation.

Uniform screening: LouVax–Broadbent was structured so that there were six drive-through lanes and a
seventh station that provided an area for walk-up traffic as well as spaces for 4–5 cars to stop and park, if
needed. Individuals were directed to enter one of the
six lanes as they entered the arena from Zone 1 outside the arena. Once inside Zone 2 and in a lane, a
greeter would go to the car and begin a screening process, asking about current illness and checking temperature with an infrared scanning thermometer. If an individual registered a temperature greater than 100 °F,
the Zone 2 Blue Vest was alerted to provide a more
in-depth assessment. Zone 2 lanes and the LouVax
arena are shown in Figure 7. In the event that an individual was deemed unable to be vaccinated (e.g., ill,
still in quarantine period), a card was placed on the
outside of their car windshield—indicating movement
through the lane without vaccination—and that person was rescheduled to return for vaccination at a later
date. If special needs were identified, such as an unanticipated need for an interpreter, a sign was placed on
the dashboard of the car directing them to Zone 2A,
the location designated for walk-up vaccinations and
special needs, where interpreter services would be provided (Figure 8). After temperature screening, vaccine recipients were moved forward in their individual
lanes toward the vaccination tables.
Infection prevention and control: All personnel
working inside in Zone 2 also had temperature checks
prior to entering the arena area, and all were required
to wear medical-grade masks. These masks were pro-
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vided by LMPHW and made available for all personnel at the point of entry into LouVax–Broadbent. Face
coverings could be worn in addition to masks, at the
preference of the volunteer, but not as a replacement
for medical masks. Boxes of masks were visible and accessible throughout the site to ensure immediate availability. All personnel were provided with a dress code
that included closed-toe shoes in case a needle were
to be dropped. Setup and end-of-day procedures included cleaning and disinfection of all surfaces using germicidal agents included on the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) List N.[11] Biosafety cabinets
were cleaned and disinfected according to a written
protocol at setup and the end of the day. All supplies available for use at the event, including ancillary
kits, personal protective equipment (PPE), and clerical
supplies, were stored in a supply/logistics area maintained by LMPHW personnel, the Blue Vest team, and
the pharmacy lead (Figure 9). Alcohol-based hand rub
was available at every vaccination station, at the pharmacy area, and at all greeter stations. Orientation for
each session included a review of mask use and hand
hygiene. Gloves were made available at each vaccination station. Injection technique focused on CDC guidance, Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) bloodborne pathogen standards, and infection
control practice, which all stressed the use of gloves as
protection against blood/body fluid exposure and not
as standard injection practice equipment. Protecting
the vaccine recipient through evidence-based infection
prevention and control competencies was the foundation for this aspect of orientation and practice monitor10
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Figure 8. Zone 2A for walk-ins and special needs showing colorcoded table covering.

ing.
Safe injection practices: Each day, syringe and needle combinations that had been provided in the vaccine
ancillary kits were reviewed with volunteers. Signs
indicating the “Syringe and Needle Combination of
the Day” were used during orientation and remained
posted throughout the session (Figure 10). If, at any
point during the day, those combinations were changed
(e.g., due to availability), a new sign was made and
information shared with each vaccinator. The syringe
and nuances that may impact administration of the entire dose were reviewed. An example involved the use
of syringes with retractable needles and the need to
completely inject and initiate needle retraction while
still in the muscle of the recipient. Any syringe or needle contamination, or any concern about the sterility of
the needle/syringe or the vaccine, prompted immediate sequestering of the item(s) and return to the pharmacy area for review, investigation, and documentation.
Administration techniques: All of the COVID-19
vaccines were to be administered intramuscularly (IM),
with the deltoid muscle as the primary injection site
of choice. As LouVax–Broadbent operated as a drivethrough event, individuals received their vaccine while
remaining in their vehicle. The technique for deltoid injection varied with the position of the recipient, height
of the vehicle, height of the injector, and preference
of the recipient. Approaches for IM administration in
this setting were reviewed as part of each shift orientation. In addition, the Blue Vest team regularly scanned
for Band-Aid location to identify injection sites that appeared to be too close to the shoulder joint (potentially
too high) and those that appeared to be too close to
the lower aspect of the upper arm (potentially too low).
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Figure 9. Supply/logistics area.

Technique reviews were performed regularly throughout each session. Hand hygiene practices and immediate activation of safety devices were also monitored
during the walking rounds made by the Blue Vest team.
Documentation: A paper consent form was used
throughout the 17-week operation of LouVax–
Broadbent. Efforts were made to move to an electronic documentation process through a cloud-based
application program developed in SalesForce™. Major
challenges to use of the electronic system for documentation (e.g., reliable internet, ability to identify individuals in the system, ease of use, ability to quickly learn
and use the system, willingness to learn and use the
system, changes and enhancements to the system) existed among the volunteer workforce. Therefore, use of
a paper consent process that could serve as a reliable
source document continued throughout the LouVax–
Broadbent operation as parallel documentation. The
consent form contained demographic information,
screening questions, and an area for documentation
of the vaccine brand, dose, lot number, expiration date,
anatomic site of administration, date of administration,
and the name and credentials of the injector. Each vaccine recipient was also given a CDC vaccination card
with a sticker containing the name of the vaccine, dose,
date of vaccination, lot number, and site of administration (LouVax–Broadbent). The vaccine recipient name
and date of birth were handwritten on the card, and a
date of return for second dose was entered on the back
of the card (21 or 28 days later). Individuals returning
for a second dose of vaccine without their original CDC
vaccination card would have their first dose verified by
review of the Kentucky Immunization Registry (KYIR),
and a new CDC vaccination card with documentation
for both doses would be provided.
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Figure 10. Needle and syringe of the day.

Adverse events: Monitoring for immediate adverse
events required that all individuals at the vaccination
tables be aware of clinical presentations and ‘complaints of significance,’ have competence in patient assessment, and have a low threshold for sign and symptom ‘acceptance.’ Orientation included a review of
common occurrences post-vaccination, such as syncope, other immediate complaints, such as itching or
respiratory concerns, and first-line intervention, including changes in positioning, removal of seat belts,
and opening of car doors. An emergency drug box was
readily available and included written protocols for use
of oral diphenhydramine and epinephrine autoinjectors, both of which were included in the drug box. An
emergency air horn was located at each vaccination table so that a call for rapid assistance could be initiated
and the vaccination lines stopped until deemed appropriate to restart by the Blue Vest team leader and/or
the LMPHW Medical Director. Emergency Medical
Services personnel were on-site in Zone 3 for postvaccination monitoring once a car had left the Zone
2 vaccination area. In the event that any immediate
adverse event was recognized, the circumstances surrounding the event and any intervention was recorded
on the consent form and in Sales Force™ if the system was operational. All Blue Vest team members had
experience with emergency response post-vaccination,
but each member also had a review of emergency protocols as part of their orientation and competence assessment.
Patient education: Patient education began at the
time of registration prior to entering the site for vaccination. LMPHW provided electronic copies of the
vaccine fact sheets and information regarding the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) cell

phone adverse event monitoring system (CDC V-safe).
Once the individuals were inside the arena, they were
provided with a hard copy of the vaccine fact sheet
(either Pfizer or Moderna). Children under 18 years
required parental consent either in writing or verbally in direct communication with the injector.1 Patient education included information about the vaccine, expected immune responses (e.g., fever, myalgias,
malaise, headache), other adverse events, and how to
contact LMPHW for reporting or questions. During
the first ten weeks of the event, each participant was
shown a QR code and asked to use their cell phone
to connect to the CDC V-safe reporting system. Individuals could complete that process during their postvaccination wait time while in Zone 3. After the first ten
weeks of the event, V-safe information was provided
electronically, and individuals were prompted to connect independently.
The drive-through process: Two vaccination tables
were positioned in each lane approximately 30 feet
apart, enabling multiple individuals to be vaccinated
at the same time. At each vaccination table, there
were three volunteer personnel: one licensed healthcare worker trained to administer intramuscular vaccination, one person responsible for completing the CDC
vaccination card, and one person responsible for ensuring completion of the consent form and entering patient data into the SalesForce™ system via laptop. As
previously mentioned, stickers were printed each day
with the information about the vaccine doses to be administered that day. Stickers were placed on the consent form and the CDC vaccination card. Access to premade stickers assisted with time management, legibility, and error prevention. As additional assistance with
second dosing and error prevention, Moderna vaccine

1 The

initial EUA for the Pfizer mRNA vaccine included individuals 16 and older. When LouVax opened to the general public for vaccination
(i.e., after healthcare workers and teachers), children 16 and older came for vaccination. Anyone under the age of 18 years of age required
parental consent.
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Figure 11. Vaccination stations in operation for one vaccine type.

stickers were blue print on white labels and Pfizer vaccine stickers were black print on white labels with a
purple highlighter line drawn down the middle of the
sticker.
During the first five weeks of the LouVax–Broadbent
operation, the Moderna vaccine was the sole vaccine
administered. As the Pfizer vaccine became available
as part of the state’s vaccine allocation, the Pfizer vaccine was added to the process. Pfizer representatives
were invited to the Broadbent site, and processes and
procedures for use of that vaccine were reviewed and
demonstrated. Procedures for storage, handling, and
dilution were written and incorporated into the training provided for all Zone 2 personnel. “Dry runs” were
conducted to identify process concerns and bottlenecks, and staffing numbers and responsibilities were
adjusted. This became particularly important for volunteers assigned to the pharmacy area. By this time,
second-dose Moderna vaccines were beginning to be
ULJRI | https://ir.library.louisville.edu/jri/vol6/iss1/3

administered, so it was determined that the LouVax–
Broadbent process would include access to both Pfizer
and Moderna vaccines throughout each vaccination
session. Vaccines were assigned to specific lanes (e.g.,
Lanes 1–3 Pfizer and Lanes 4–6 Moderna). Tablecloths
were used to designate tables for specific vaccines (e.g.,
blue plastic tablecloths for Moderna), and signage was
made for each table. Figure 11 shows the vaccination
tables in operation, and Figure 8 shows tables with a
Moderna color-coded table covering used when both
vaccines (Pfizer and Moderna) were being administered. Zone 1 personnel directed individuals into specific lanes for access to a specific vaccine, and verification was done by greeters and vaccination personnel.
As all vaccines were entered into KYIR within 24 hours
of administration (transfered from SalesForce™ into
the state registry), anyone reporting for a second dose
had an initial verification of vaccination performed either by visualizing their CDC vaccination card or by
verification through SalesForce™ or the immunization
13
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Protecting the vaccine administration workforce
Ensuring the safety of all personnel involved in vaccine administration was woven into the entire process,
beginning with screening of individuals entering the
LouVax–Broadbent site. Standardized training for all
personnel included infection prevention and control
practice, sharps safety, selection and use of personal
protective equipment (PPE), continuous process monitoring, and performance improvement.
As previously discussed, all individuals entering the
arena were screened for elevated temperature and
symptom and exposure review (e.g., ill, cough, known
COVID-19 exposure). Randomized COVID-19 antigen
testing was also done for the volunteer workforce along
with contact tracing in the event that an ill volunteer
or employee was identified. In the event that any personnel was identified as antigen-positive, they were referred to a health department site for polymerase chain
reaction (PCR) by nasopharyngeal (NP) swab testing,
with results followed by the contact tracing team for
the City of Louisville. Personnel entering Zone 2 were
required to wear a medical mask at all times. Food and
drink, other than bottled water, were prohibited at the
vaccination tables to minimize mask removal. A break
area was provided with tables and chairs positioned to
promote and maintain social distancing. Training included review of infection control basics such as hand
hygiene; safe injection practices; syringe and needle review, emphasizing safety devices; PPE, including mask
and glove availability; and any process updates, such
as lane and vaccine designations for that particular
day or shift. Traffic flow for the vaccination lanes was
constructed with barricades and signage. Training for
all personnel included adherence to walkway instructions, location of fire extinguishers, emergency exits,
and emergency exit procedures. Newsletters were developed and distributed that included changes or updates relevant to the drive-through processes and vaccination procedures. Blue Vest team members included
worker safety elements in continuous monitoring and
intervened in real time, as appropriate.

Results
Between January 4, 2021, and April 28, 2021, LouVax–
Broadbent was open for operation for 82 days. The
site was closed for 3 days due to severe weather in the
Louisville area and opened on one Saturday to compensate for the closures. The average time spent on
site for those receiving the vaccine was 35 minutes,
including all activities from arrival through completion of the observation period. An average of 1,325
individuals were vaccinated each day, with a maximum of 1,829 vaccinated in a single day. A total of
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109,529 doses of COVID-19 vaccine were administered
at LouVax–Broadbent. There were no identified anaphylaxis events. Oral diphenhydramine was administered to ten vaccine recipients complaining of itching
following vaccine administration.
A total of 154 personnel were needed per shift (three
shifts per ten-hour day), of which 39 were paid staff
(LMPHW or City of Louisville) and 115 were volunteers (74.7%). More than 240 orientation sessions
were conducted and 27 training documents developed.
A total of 2,561 volunteers served the community at
LouVax–Broadbent, yielding approximately 81,200 volunteer hours, generating an estimated economic impact of $2.2 million. The average volunteer served
more than 32 hours, and the volunteer workforce consisted of 278 retired and actively employed registered
nurses, advanced practice registered nurses, licensed
practical nurses, certified nursing assistants, and medical assistants. In addition, 138 physicians, 5 dentists, 16
first responders, and 67 pharmacists provided volunteer hours. Additional volunteers represented the full
spectrum of the community, including individuals with
expertise in information technology, general business,
and academia. Medical, nursing, and pharmacy students from six schools participated. A total of 1,134 volunteers (45%) received their COVID-19 vaccination at
LouVax–Broadbent. There were no known COVID-19
exposure events (unmasked personnel and unmasked
vaccine recipient) at LouVax–Broadbent. There were
three needlestick injuries reported, all occurring during
activation of the safety device and none involving use
of the syringes with retractable needles. Exposure protocols were immediately implemented, and there have
been no identified bloodborne pathogen transmission
events.
Procedures that served to protect the vaccine resulted
in a waste of 132 (0.12%) of the 109,529 prepared doses.
Eighty-one of those 132 wasted doses occurred during
the final three weeks of the drive-through event, when
vaccine had become broadly available through other
sites (e.g., workplace campaigns, pharmacies). Efforts
to minimize waste included the use of call lists to identify those who were willing and able to immediately
report to the arena for any remaining doses at the end
of each vaccination day.
Keeping the flow of traffic through the drive-through
process was important, so preparations were made to
assist cars that had difficulty restarting following their
time spent at the vaccination table. Cars were turned
off while awaiting vaccination to protect the safety of
the healthcare workers and to minimize engine idle
time inside the arena. During the 82 vaccination days,
more than 250 cars required assistance (e.g., battery
jump start), with one needing to be towed. There were
no vehicular accidents and no personnel injuries involving vehicles.
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Lessons learned
The 17 weeks of LouVax provided a number of important experiences and lessons learned, many focused on
education and training needs to ensure competence of
the healthcare workforce.
(1) Healthcare personnel, retired and actively working,
were willing to participate in the drive-through immunization event as volunteers. The Kentucky Nurses Association was an important collaborator with the LMPHW in sharing information regarding the need for
nurse volunteers. The Greater Louisville Medical Society, the Louisville Dental Society, and local schools of
Nursing and Pharmacy were also key partners. Access
to vaccine was an incentive for volunteer recruitment,
as all volunteers were eligible for vaccination following
completion of forty hours of volunteer service at LouVax. Often, access to vaccine occurred prior to completion of those forty hours as any doses that had been
prepared for administration and remained unused at
the end of the vaccination day were made available to
unvaccinated volunteers. Available doses were prioritized based upon hours of volunteer service and disclosed risk factors of the individual volunteers seeking
vaccination (e.g., age, underlying health conditions).
Interestingly, the vast majority of volunteers continued
to volunteer at LouVax after receiving vaccine.
(2) Nursing student groups were regular participants
in Zone 2. For students to be engaged in vaccination,
they were required to have their instructor present and
responsible for oversight. All students and instructors
were required to participate in the orientation training.
Location of student groups was an important consideration for the Blue Vest team as the students required
additional time for vaccination. Therefore, placement
of student groups varied according to the number of
volunteers, anticipated numbers of individuals coming
to the site for vaccination, scheduled walk-in groups,
and the length of time for which the students were able
to participate (e.g., any limitations in clinical hours).
(3) A web-based platform to enable volunteer signup
and active two-way communication was critical in recruiting volunteers as well as organizing daily activities. The Blue Vest team reviewed volunteer lists daily
and used that information to allocate staffing for the
vaccination tables.
(4) Regular changes in supplies and equipment available for use by the volunteers required daily review
and education. Ancillary supply kits were available
at the arena, and supplies were prepared for the next
day’s use. Key to this preparation was identifying
the needle/syringe combinations to be used the next
day. This enabled training for pharmacy personnel and
preparation for training of the next day’s volunteers.
ULJRI | https://ir.library.louisville.edu/jri/vol6/iss1/3
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(5) Provision of standardized training and participation in training prior to volunteering for a given shift
enabled consistent performance among the volunteers
with respect to infection control and personnel safety
practices. Of particular importance was demonstration
of the daily syringe and needle combinations, with emphasis on safety device activation as some of those devices were not familiar to the volunteer workforce.
(6) Written training manuals available at each vaccination table enabled volunteers to have reference materials readily available. Training manuals included environmental disinfection procedures, injection procedures, patient education materials, CDC V-safe information, and post-injection adverse events and management, as well as copies of patient and provider fact
sheets, consent forms with rationale for screening questions, parental consent forms, and Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) information sheets.
(7) Appropriate use of gloves and appropriate hand
hygiene practice were two areas of continuous training.
Some nurses were insistent upon the wearing of gloves
for performance of injection. Such glove use often replaced performance of hand hygiene between patient
contact and was a focus of intervention and training
by the Blue Vest team. Glove use was not considered
to be part of routine injection practice, but hand hygiene was. Gloves were readily available if there was
concern about exposure to blood/body fluids. Injection technique reviewed at every orientation stressed
approaches designed to minimize exposure situations
(e.g., assisting patient with relaxation, removal of tight
sleeves, positioning of the arm, use of 2×2 immediately
upon removal of the needle, immediate site pressure
following injection, use of Band-Aids). Some nurses
stated that they regularly cleaned their gloves with alcohol hand rub as part of their standard practice. This
was discouraged and, if that practice was noted, individuals were removed from the vaccination area for retraining and discussion.
(8) Clerical roles that involved documentation of information on the CDC vaccination cards and consent
forms and data entry into Sales Force™ relied upon
volunteers with and without healthcare experience. A
common comment from retired healthcare workers involved hesitance to learn and use “another computer
system.” The Blue Vest team actively recruited nonclinical volunteers to perform those clerical roles and
be involved in training regarding those roles. This was
a critical step as it engaged an additional aspect of local
community support while also removing a stressor for
the volunteer healthcare workforce.
(9) Having vaccination tables disinfected and set up
prior to the start of the day supported elements of
training, including supplies to be used during injection,
hand hygiene products, emergency air horns, training
15
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manuals, and vaccine stickers for the day. The Blue Vest
team prepared tables prior to the opening of the site
each day and worked with the last volunteer shift to remove supplies and disinfect tables at the end of the day.
Twice a week, a tub of supplies was delivered to each
vaccination table by LMPHW personnel. This enabled
availability of standardized supplies necessary for vaccination. It also enabled evaluation of supply use in
the event that information needed to be added to orientation sessions (e.g., hand hygiene supplies scantily
used).

Identifying healthcare workers with these competencies was one of the biggest challenges and required constant monitoring and oversight. A pharmacy lead was
quickly identified and was responsible for training and
practice monitoring.

(10) Preparation of vaccine occurred in a designated
pharmacy area. The three biosafety cabinets provided
a clean environment. Traffic/interruption to that area
was actively discouraged. Not all healthcare personnel
were able to demonstrate competence in the steps necessary to withdraw correct vaccine doses into syringes
or to demonstrate the steps necessary to safely and correctly dilute vaccine. This became a major area of training and competence demonstration. It became evident
that approaches currently used in healthcare settings
involved preparation of medication doses by pharmacy
personnel. Consequently, physicians and nurses often struggled with filling syringes with correct volumes
and using evidence-based infection control techniques.

This mass immunization event demonstrated the depth
of interest and willingness of healthcare workers and
various members of the community to participate in
vaccination efforts. The sense of unity against the
common threat of COVID-19 provided opportunities
to share and learn skills and showed a sense of volunteerism that has not been previously seen. The question now is how to continue to use this level of willingness and interest as part of the ongoing battle with this
pandemic and other such threats in the future. Sharing the experiences gained through LouVax–Broadbent
may help other communities to develop and implement similar approaches, including mobile vaccination
events, and be confident in training approaches.
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